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Although much of what I have to say can be applied to all fields of scholar- 
ship, my remarks are exclusively addressed to the sciences, mathematics, 
and philosophy. I have chosen to focus on these three areas because they are 
concerned with the acquisition of knowledge through the construction of 
theories and because I believe that we have entered an era in which theoretical 
research is seriously threatened as a consequence of the necessity of special- 
ization. Thus my concern is not with what C. P. Snow calls the “two cultures” 
of scientists and literary intellectuals, but with the “many cultures” of the 
world of theoretical research. 
It is common knowledge that, in our day, success-not to mention survival 
-in academia demands early and intense specialization. There are now entire 
disciplines within what was once regarded as a sub-discipline. As the rate of 
accumulation of knowledge increases, the process by which focus of attention 
and interest is narrowed continues. It seems reasonable to conclude that this 
phenomenon of increased specialization is simply a part of the evolution of 
the acquisition of knowledge and that, accordingly, there is no cause for 
concern. As individuals we know more about less, but collectively we know 
more about more. Though this conclusion may be comfortable, it is also 
shortsighted and dangerous. The purpose of this paper is to point out 
dangers in our present trend towards increased specialization in theoretical 
research and to suggest some realistic ways of dealing with these. 
Specialization has played an important and even indispensable role in the 
tremendous increase of knowledge during the last fifty years. However, this 
must not blind us to the fact that specialization has been a mixed blessing. 
* IPN Institute is grateful to Professor Zassenhaus for his kind invitation to present a 
statement of the philosophy and purpose of our Institute in conjunction with the publishing 
of this special issue of the Journal of Number Theory including many of the papers present- 
ed at our conference and testimonial dinner honoring Professor Sarvadaman Chowla 
on the occasion of his seventieth year. This paper is an abstract of an address to the Ad- 
visory Board of IPN Institute and is included here as a message of crucial importance 
to the entire scientific community. 
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The present degree of specialization has infected us with the insidious disease 
of intellecutal isolationism. This disease manifests ‘itself in several symptoms: 
The inability to see or appreciate the relevance of the content, methods, and 
models of other theoretical disciplines to our own; an intellectual protec- 
tionism that dictates that outsiders can have little or nothing of significance 
to say about one’s field of specialization; a condition that fosters an un- 
precedented degree of concern with minutiae; a lack of attention to the 
possibilities for theoretical synthesis; the existence of an inbred, scholastic 
philosophy that is largely irrelevant to the content of contemporary science 
and the problems of modern life. 
It was not always so. The expression “natural philosophy” reminds us of a 
time when divisions of intellectual labor were relatively insignificant. The 
early Greeks made little of the distinctions between various branches of 
knowledge. This may be explained in part by the fact that in those days the 
body of knowledge was very much smaller than today, but this is not the 
whole story. There was a fundamental difference in attitude-a conviction that 
knowledge is all of a piece and that error and truth in one part mattered very 
much for every other part. This view prevailed until the beginnings of modern 
specialization. In fact, up until the beginning of the nineteenth century all 
learning was called “philosophy.” This usage barely survives, as, for example, 
in the Philosophical Transactions that contains papers of the Royal Society 
on all sorts of subjects and in our degree “Doctor of Philosophy.” 
The expression “natural philosophy” came into use in the seventeenth 
century as a label for the natural science of Galileo and Newton. Since 
“philosophy” and “science” (the latter being the Latin word for knowledge) 
were synonymous, natural philosophy became known as natural science. 
Even today there are professors of “Natural Philosophy” who engage in 
research in the sciences or the philosophy of science. Moreover, the expression 
“natural philosophy” is also used to refer to the philosophy of nature as 
practiced by our philosophical predecessors from the pre-Socratics to 
Francis Bacon. It would also be a fitting label for the work of William James, 
Jules Henri Poincart, Pierre Duhem, Bertrand Russell, Albert Einstein, 
Erwin Schrodinger, and Niels Bohr, to name but a few moderns whose 
philosophy has been firmly rooted in and entwined with the sciences. 
What we can learn from this era of natural philosophy is the value of an 
attitude that stresses the interrelatedness of knowledge. This is of crucial 
importance. The concept of the interrelatedness of knowledge can provide a 
framework for conducting research and inquiry in a manner that avoids the 
problems of specialization. The following proposals for research strategies 
and policies fall within this framework. These proposals are not exhaustive. 
They are intended to illustrate how a past approach to the sciences can be 
used as a guide for more meaningful contemporary research. 
To begin with, we need to encourage research that crosses disciplines when 
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it is appropriate to do so. This type of activity has some precedent, but has 
not been stressed nearly enough. Molecular biology owes its birth to the 
encouragement of research in the borderline areas where biology, physics, 
and chemistry merge. Today new possibilities exist in areas where psychology, 
linguistics, and computer science merge. The same is true of neurophysiology 
and psychology, as well as sociology and biology. Many new meaningful 
syntheses are possible. 
Secondly, we should encourage serious multidisciplinary workshops that 
focus on sharing the content, methods, models, and problems of two or more 
disciplines. These need to be genuine workshops-not mere paper reading 
conferences. If properly focused, such workshops would suggest the appli- 
cation of approaches of one discipline to another. They could result in new 
theoretical insights, reveal presuppositions that impede progress, and 
inspire new directions for inquiry. 
Thirdly, the value we claim to place on new ideas should be reflected in our 
grant system. At present there is no room for funding open-ended exploratory 
research that allows a scientist of proven merit to follow up new ideas as 
they develop. Professor Leigh Van Valen (Nature 261, (May 6, 1976)) has 
made a strong case for this kind of funding on the grounds that present policy 
encourages deception in grant application, promotes less than exciting 
research and is not supportive of truly creative science. 
This means that there is little support for an established scientist who 
wants to expand his work in another discipline. This type of research is often 
of fundamental importance. When Schrodinger applied his insights as a 
physicist to the problems of biology, he gave us “What is Life ?“-a work that 
was destined to play a significant role in the development of biology. Of 
course, funding such projects is not as safe as the funding of relatively 
predictable research that concentrates on minutiae. We pay a price for 
encouraging creativity, but the cost is much greater if we choose to stifle it. 
Finally, we need to encourage an approach to philosophy that holds hope 
of giving the mother of all our disciplines new life and vitality. Great 
philosophy grows out of the concerns of the sciences. It cannot survive cut off 
from its roots. 
All these things we can and must do, not merely for the sake of reviving 
a past we admire, but for the sake of rescuing contemporary science from the 
excesses of specialization, thereby enriching our understanding of nature. 
